
## **Summary of this analysis**

Other analysts use relatively complex statistical methods to analyse low volumes of unreliable camera partnership data for narrowly-defined sites, accepting from the outset that their estimates of the effects of cameras will be subject to wide margins of error. It's all utter nonsense! (App A)

This analysis avoids all their problems, using just simple arithmetic to analyse **much more and better police Stats19 data**, **and by assessing camera effects only from installation onwards**, when selection bias and regression to mean effects have, by definition ended. **Here's how:** 

- Obtain as much Stats19 data and as many camera locations and installation dates as possible.
- Calculate the distance from each collision to the nearest camera and record it if within 1km.
- Calculate and record the number of months between each collision and camera installation.
- Sum the collisions occurring within 1km of a camera according to that difference in months.
- Draw graphs of those monthly totals:





- The red trend line represents the average FSC trend in the same 23 areas.
- The underlying trend of site data is averaged out by summing relative to installation. (App. E)
- Site selection bias and regression to mean, by definition, end before installation so cannot affect the maroon part of the graph. (App. E)
- All *confounding* effects not linked to installation dates are averaged out in the same way so cannot affect either the blue or the maroon parts of the graph. (App. E)
- The effects of cameras are not averaged out so only they can affect the maroon graph.

This and every other graph of this type shows that (a) there are no reductions in collisions following installation when they would logically occur if cameras were effective and (b) there are clear and significant adverse changes of trend, confirming that cameras lead to more deaths and injuries than would otherwise have occurred.

These results are beyond rational dispute.

## **Other Analyses' Fundamental Errors**

- Failing to realise that **far more and better collision data** was easily available from police Stats19 records than from camera partnerships.
- Failing to realise that, however limited and flawed their other data might be, partnerships might reasonably be expected to know where and when their cameras operate.
- Using partnerships' annual collision totals and camera installation dates that limit the accuracy of the results instead of insisting on monthly data.
- Using partnerships' collision data for narrowly-defined camera sites, thereby ignoring the adverse effects long known to extend beyond those boundaries.
- Failing to realise that **collisions** inherently positioned in time **relative to the installation dates** of large numbers of **cameras installed over many years** can easily be **differentiated from all other effects on the basis of timing alone.**
- Ignoring or trivialising the *regression to mean* reductions made inevitable by installing most cameras where collision numbers had recently been high.
- After well-justified complaints had made it impossible to continue to ignore regression to mean, claiming to have quantified and then corrected for it, by one fanciful method or another, failing to realise that it is quite impossible to do so accurately because most of the relevant data simply is not available!
- Believing that cameras can eliminate far more collisions than ever involve speeding.
- Continuing to believe that speed reductions achieved by cameras cut collision rates despite being unable to identify any relationship between the two.
- Failing to realise that **much the greater part DfT's "values"** of collisions supposedly prevented are entirely notional, not hard cash.
- Failing to realise that the DfT's very large figure for the "lost output" of fatalities is at least cancelled out by the value of what they no longer consume.
- In all these ways, turning what could and should have been simple analysis into an over-complicated shambles that not even they understand.
- And most important of all, helping to sustain one of the worst road safety policies this
  country has ever seen, at a cost to date not only of several billion pounds but worse, an
  substantial but unquantifiable number of deaths and injuries that would otherwise not have
  occurred.