Appendix J The simple long-term method and TfL's bogus claims

Fig. 4 of App. A shows how SSB, RTM, varying timings and trend make it impossible to analyse what happens in the middle years of that theoretical graph, or indeed of Fig. 1 below, an equivalent **graph of KSI drawn from Transport for London's site data.**



Fig. 1 Transport for London KSI data, fixed camera sites installed 1994-2008

This graph of London KSI is similar to Fig. 4 of App. A in that both graphs are affected by differing installation dates and delays, trends, SSB and RTM. The higher totals in the middle years show that **SSB at TfL sites was higher** than the 23.3% assumed for the example.

It is impossible to analyse the middle years (App. F) but it is clear that there was a substantial reduction in KSI from 1990 (when SSB had little effect and RTM had none) to 2011 (when neither had any effect). **But what matters is how the fall compares to where there were no cameras**-



KSI Comparison at London camera sites and elsewhere

Fortunately, that comparison is easy to do (Fig. 2) and it is clear that there was **no sensibly identifiable difference between falls with or without cameras – i.e. the cameras had no effect.**

Analysis based on circular sites shows much the same:



Fig. 3 FSC within **500m** of TfL's fixed cameras and outside TfL's official sites (Stats19 data)

Fig. 3 **compares FSC within 500m of TfL's cameras with those further away**. It is clearly similar in shape to Fig. 2 based on TfL's own site data, except that numbers are higher due to the larger areas. Here the long-term reductions at TfL's sites seem **marginally worse than where there were no cameras.**



Fig. 4 FSC within 250m of TfL's fixed cameras and beyond (Stats19 data)

Fig. 4 is as Fig. 3 but for collisions within 250m not 500m. This time too the reductions at TfL's sites seem **marginally worse than where there were no cameras.**

Many more graphs like the ones for London may be drawn using the **limited amount of partnership data** as yet available or the **much larger volume based on Stats19 data** available here. However, **no more of these graphs are provided here** because their accuracy is, to an extent, compromised by possible differences in trend at camera sites and elsewhere, for example when effective road safety measures that were applied where cameras were not.

TfL has been aware of these figures since July 2014

Within 24 hours of receiving their data in July 2014 this analyst **repeatedly e-mailed Transport for London to point out that their own data showed that their cameras, at best, had no effect on collision or injury rates**. Several offers to visit TfL to discuss the analysis were rejected as were **multiple written complaints** to the Managing Director and Panel of TfL Surface Transport.

From September 2014 to mid 2015 an Emeritus Professor of Statistics long experienced in camera analysis **visited TfL four times to present his assessment showing net adverse effects.** He left each time under the impression that his figures had been agreed **but nothing changed except that a few weeks after the first visit TfL stated that installation of 600 more cameras was under way! (App. A and K)**

All the correspondence and media comment are at http://www.fightbackwithfacts.com/tfls-bogus-claim/

But these graphs can still be useful, to an extent

Although the limitations of these long-term comparisons make it impossible for the results to be as accurate as those of the synchronous detection method they can nevertheless provide indicative results quite quickly for areas for which camera details have been withheld – i.e. 19 of the 43 police areas.

The simple test it provides is, as above, **whether falls in collision numbers were greater at camera sites than elsewhere – and the answer is clearly that they are not.**

end