## Appendix P Blame and Responsibility

Much of the blame for the expensive and counter-productive speed camera disaster lies with the DfT for failing to understand what data was needed, to ensure that all partnerships use the same methods and data formats, that data was promptly made available in consistent and accessible formats and most of all for believing palpably absurd claims of camera enefit.

Blame also lies with camera partnerships and their data managers for failing to collate and publish readily-available data, for publishing annual not monthly totals, for analysing data covering only the roads on which cameras were located, for not realising that camera effects can be differentiated from others on the basis of timing alone and for failing to notice that the quite rapid falls that should occur shortly after installation of effective cameras do not occur.

Also to blame were **senior police officers**, in this analysts' experience incapable of understanding the data yet vehement in their support for cameras, and also apparently **incapable of recognising the conflict of interest inherent in receiving more money for catching more speeding drivers.** 

Also to blame were analysts who accepted apparently without question the severe limitations imposed by the "smallness of the numbers and limited extent of the data" and without realising that more than enough, more detailed data were readily available in Stats19 records, that useful indications of collision reductions due to RTM can easily be determined using only Stats19 data, for analysing data covering only the roads on which cameras were located, for not realising that camera effects can be differentiated from others on the basis of timing alone and for failing to notice that the quite rapid falls that should occur shortly after installation of effective cameras do not occur.

And of course all of the above for ignoring repeated complaints that their methods and results were clearly flawed.

end